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opposition will be provided.
Thank you for your consideration•
Sincedrely,

W^^lUmh^
HAN

DECKER

>istant Attorney General
Ciriminal Appeals Division
MD:JN
Enclosures

FILED
NOV 2 0 1991
CLERK SUPREME COURT
UTAH

mmm§
p

FILED

27 1991

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

___

OFFICE Or ^L
ooooo—-VTT03NEV GENE^
S t a t e of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

OPINION
(For Publication)

Mary T Noonan

Cterk of the Court
Utah Court of Appeals

v.

Case No. 890625-CA

Greg N. Oliver,

FILED
(September 26, 1991)

Defendant and Appellant.

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Michael R. Murphy
Attorneys:

Elizabeth Holbrook, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
R. Paul Van Dam and Marian Decker, Salt Lake
City, for Appellee

Before Judges Bench, Greenwood, and Jackson.
GREENWOOD, Judge:
Appellant Greg N. Oliver appeals his conviction of burglary, a
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202
(1989) and theft, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1989) on the bases that the trial court
erred in denying his motion for a continuance and that admissible
evidence supports only a misdemeanor theft conviction. We affirm
in part, and reverse and remand in part.
BACKGROUND
At 2:30 p.m. on January 7, 1989, John Spielmans returned home
from a basketball game with his son. He noticed that the side
door to his garage, which was usually locked, was open.
Spielmans went into the garage to investigate. He then saw a man
dressed in a dark cap and dark jacket jump over a chain link
fence ten to twelve feet away and run north. Spielmans began
chasing the man, but lost sight of him. Spielmans returned home
and noticed that the front door to his house was dented and that
it appeared someone had been inside the house. He called 911 and
waited outside for the police to arrive. While he was waiting,
one of Spielmans's neighbors called his attention to a man who
was leaning against a wooden fence across the street. Noting the

similarity of that person's clothing to that of the man he had
observed running away, Spielmans concluded it was the same
person, Spielmans walked toward the manf who began running
toward a car parked nearby. The man got into the car and looked
over his left shoulder as Spielmans approached him and said, "It
wasn't me, man" before driving off. Spielmans again called 911
and described the car, including the license plate number and the
direction of travel.
When Deputy Matthews arrived to investigate, Spielmans told
him that a watch, a gold ring, four one-dollar bills and four or
five gold Canadian coins were missing from his house. Deputy
Matthews also spoke with Spielmans's neighbor who saw the man run
across his front yard, climb into the parked car and speed away
when Spielmans approached him.
Deputy Matthews ran a computer check on the license plate of
the car and obtained the vehicle owner's name and address. He
then went to the vicinity of that address to investigate further.
He saw a man fitting the description that Spielmans had given,
exit the vehicle owner's residence.
Based on his own observations, the license plate number of the
car and the descriptions given by both Spielmans and his
neighbor, Deputy Matthews obtained a picture of defendant, Greg
N. Oliver, from the police records division. The next day, he
returned to Spielmans's home with the photo of Oliver and showed
it to Spielmans, advising him that he had reason to believe that
Oliver was the same person Spielmans described. Spielmans
identified Oliver as the man he had seen.
Three days after the incident, Deputy Matthews assembled a
photo spread, including the picture of Oliver and pictures of
five other men. He showed the photo spread to Spielmans, who
again identified Oliver as the suspect. Deputy Matthews also
showed the photo spread to three of Spielmans's neighbors, two of
whom identified Oliver as the person they had observed the day of
the incident.
Oliver was arrested and charged with one count of burglary, a
second degree felony and one count of theft, a third degree
felony.
The trial judge granted two continuances prior to the case
actually being tried. At the final pretrial conference, on
August 28, 1989, Oliver's attorney told the trial judge that he
was ready to proceed to trial and agreed to a trial date of
September 5, 1989.
After the pretrial conference, Oliver entered into plea
negotiations with the State. The trial judge's clerk told both
the State and Oliver's attorney, however, to prepare as if they
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were going to trial as scheduled. The night before trial, Oliver
agreed to the State's plea proposal and decided that he would
enter a guilty plea in the morning rather than go to trial. The
next morning, however, Oliver changed his mind and decided that
he wanted to go to trial. Oliver's attorney moved for a one day
continuance, stating that he needed more time to formally prepare
for trial. The trial judge denied this motion. Oliver was
convicted by a jury of one count of second degree burglary and
one count of third degree theft.
ISSUES
On appeal Oliver argues that: (1) the trial court's denial of
his motion for a continuance denied him due process of law;
(2) the trial court's denial of his motion for a continuance
denied him effective assistance of counsel; and (3) admissible
evidence supports only a class A misdemeanor theft conviction.
ANALYSIS
Due Process
Oliver argues that the trial court's denial of his motion for
a one day continuance violated his right to due process because
it forced his counsel to proceed to trial without being
adequately prepared. Oliver asserts that his attorney did not
conduct any formal trial preparation after Oliver decided to
plead guilty. Consequently, when he changed his mind the next
morning and decided he wanted to go to trial, Oliver's counsel
was not sufficiently prepared. Oliver claims that had his
attorney had one more day to prepare for trial, he would have
been better prepared to: (1) support Oliver's testimony regarding
his prior conviction based on misidentification; (2) expose
weaknesses in the eyewitness identification testimony; and
(3) support Oliver's assertions concerning possible police
misconduct involved in the photo show up.
The grant or denial of a continuance is within the discretion
of the trial court. State v. Humphervs. 707 P.2d 109, 109 (Utah
1985)(per curiam); State v. Creviston, 646 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah
1982); State v. Moosman, 542 P.2d 1093, 1094 (Utah 1975). This
court will not reverse the trial court's decision absent a clear
abuse of discretion. Id.
When moving for a continuance, a party must show that denial
of the motion will prevent the party from obtaining material and
admissible evidence, that any additional witnesses it seeks can
be produced within a reasonable time, and that it has exercised
due diligence in preparing for the case before requesting the
continuance. State v. Linden, 761 P.2d 1386, 1387 (Utah 1988).
890625-CA
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Absent such showing, the trial court does not abuse its
discretion if it denies the motion. Id. We are also persuaded
by Washington precedent, that on appeal, the moving party must
show that it was materially prejudiced by the court's denial of
the continuance or that the trial result would have been
different had the continuance been granted. State v. Barker, 667
P.2d 108, 114 (Wash. App. 1983).
Oliver has failed to make the necessary showing required by
these cases. Oliver's counsel did not allege that there were any
witnesses or evidence that he needed to obtain or that would have
been available had the continuance been granted. Nor did he
state specifically what he needed to do, or how or why Oliver
would be prejudiced if he was denied the extra day. Defense
counsel simply requested time to conduct more formal trial
preparation.
Oliver's counsel also failed to demonstrate that he exercised
due diligence before requesting the continuance. Oliver's
attorney represented Oliver at an arrest warrant hearing, the
pretrial conference and throughout plea negotiations with the
State. At the pretrial conference, eight days before trial,
defense counsel told the trial judge that he was prepared to
proceed to trial. After the pretrial, the trial judge instructed
his court clerk to notify both the State and defense counsel
that, although Oliver and the State were engaged in plea
negotiations, they should prepare as if they were going to trial
anyway. The trial judge stated that Oliver was having a hard
time deciding whether or not he would accept the State's plea
bargain and that no one would know until the day of trial whether
or not he would actually enter a plea. In denying the motion,
the trial judge stated:
All counsel, prosecution and defense
counsel were told that given circumstances,
as I understand them, that Mr. Oliver could
not make up his mind, that everyone needed to
proceed, as if we were going to trial, and the
responses we got from the respective offices
of prosecution and defense is that they would
act accordingly.
On appeal, Oliver has failed to show that he was materially
prejudiced by denial of this motion. The trial lasted two days,
instead of only one, as scheduled. Therefore, Oliver's counsel
had the evening of the first day and overnight to further prepare
before the State's case had been fully presented. In essence,
because the trial went two days, Oliver's counsel was afforded
the time to prepare that he requested and which he would have had
if the continuance had been granted. All of the State's
witnesses were subject to recall by defense counsel and the trial
judge found that defense counsel took full advantage of the
890625-CA
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opportunity to cross-examine each of them. Also, because the
motion was denied and the parties had to proceed to trial, one of
the State1s witnesses was unable to appear. At the end of the
State's case, the trial judge made the following statement
regarding his denial of Oliver's motion for a continuance:
Each of the witnesses who testified
yesterday it seemed to me, that there was
full availability of cross-examination by
[defense counsel] and he took advantage of
that . . . I want to make sure the record is
very clear that full opportunity had been
made available to the defendant, to the
witnesses . . . and in fact, since the trial
did not conclude in the first day, that there
has been extra time to prepare, extra time to
do whatever is necessary . . . .
Furthermore, it appears to me that there
may have been some benefit in the sense that
this witness you mentioned, Mrs. Lehaman, is
not available.
Further, Oliver has not shown that the trial result would have
been different had the continuance been granted. The record
shows that Oliver's counsel explored all of the areas Oliver now
complains of. Defense counsel questioned Oliver about his
previous conviction based on eye witness misidentification, and
again brought the prior misidentification to the juryfs attention
during closing argument. He cross-examined each eyewitness who
testified and addressed the weaknesses of each person's testimony
at length in his closing argument. Defense counsel also crossexamined Deputy Matthews about his investigation and the photo
show up he conducted with at least one of the eyewitnesses.
Oliver did not tell his attorney that he had decided to plead
guilty until the night before trial. Any formal trial
preparation should have been done before that time. Oliver does
not show that he was materially prejudiced by the court's denial
of this motion or that the trial would have been different had
the continuance been granted. Therefore, we find that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a
continuance and that such denial did not deprive Oliver of due
process.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Oliver claims that the trial court's denial of his motion for
a one day continuance denied him effective assistance of counsel.
As in his due process argument, Oliver contends that his counsel
was not sufficiently prepared to: (1) support Oliver's testimony
regarding his prior conviction based on misidentification;
890625-CA
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(2) expose weaknesses in the eyewitness identification testimony;
or (3) support Oliver's assertions concerning possible police
misconduct involved in the photo show up. Oliver argues that his
counsel's failure to more fully explore these issues constitutes
ineffective assistance of counsel.
In Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052
(1984), the United States Supreme Court established a two-part
test for determining whether a criminal defendant's sixth
amendment right to effective assistance of counsel has been
denied. The defendant must show: (1) that his or her counsel's
performance was deficient; and (2) that counsel's performance
prejudiced the defendant. Id. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. The
defendant must prove both parts of the test in order to prevail.
Id.
An attorney's performance is deficient when it falls below the
objective standard of reasonableness. Id. at 688, 104 S. Ct. at
2064-65; State v. Temolin. 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990); State
v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 893 (Utah 1989). The defendant must
point to specific instances in the record which, under the
circumstances, show that counsel's performance was deficient.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066; Tempiin, 805
P.2d at 186; State v. Hovt. 806 P.2d 204, 212 (Utah App. 1991).
In assessing trial counsel's performance, an appellate court
must "'indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls
within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance . . . .'" Tempiin. 805 P.2d at 186 (quoting
Strickland. 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065).
Although Oliver points to three specific areas in which he
claims his counsel should have been more prepared, the record, as
discussed regarding Oliver's due process claims, establishes that
his attorney presented evidence and argument to the jury in all
of these areas. Any additional evidence would have been
cumulative. Oliver has failed to demonstrate how his counsel's
performance was deficient and therefore we need not address
whether Oliver was prejudiced by such performance. We conclude
that Oliver was not denied effective assistance of counsel.
Admissibility of Evidence
Oliver argues that the State failed to introduce admissible
evidence establishing that the value of the stolen property
totalled over $250 as required for a third degree felony theft

890625-CA
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conviction under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(1)(b) (1989)-1
Spielmans reported that a watch, a ring, four one-dollar bills
and four or five Canadian coins were stolen from his home. At
trial, Spielmans testified that the watch was worth one hundred
twenty-five dollars, the four dollar bills were worth four
dollars and that the total value of the coins was approximately
three dollars and seventy-five cents. When questioned about the
ring's value, the following exchange occurred:
Q. [THE PROSECUTOR]: And at the time that the
ring was taken, did you have an opinion as to
the value of that ring?
A. [SPIELMANS]: I did have, and whatever that
opinion was is reflected in the police report.
I donft recall.
Q: You do not recall?
A: No.
Q: Is there anything that would help refresh
your recollection?
A: Nothing other than the police report, I
believe.

Q: I'm asking you if looking at the police
report refreshes your recollection as to the
ring.
A: As to the ring?
Q: As to the ring.

Thank you.

A: I'm sure it reflects what I said.
don't recall.
1.

I just

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(1) (1989) provides:
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this dqXac
shall be punishable:
. . .

(b) as a felony of the third degree if the:
(i) value of the property or services is more than
$250 but not more than $1000;

890625-CA

7

Q: . . . Having looked at this report, this police
report, does that refresh your recollection
as to how you valued the ring at that time?
A: Yes.
Q: Okay. What was the value you placed on that ring
at that time?
A: I really can't recall. It states $200 on there.
That's what I said. If it says $200 on there, that's
what I said.
The police report was not introduced into evidence.
Oliver claims that Spielmans's testimony, based on the police
report, that the ring was worth $200 is inadmissible because
Spielmans lacked personal knowledge of the value and his memory
was not refreshed by the police report. Therefore, Oliver
contends that the State proved a total value of less than $250
for the stolen property, which constitutes a class A misdemeanor
under § 76-6-412(1)(c)2, rather than a felony.
The State argues that the evidence presented is sufficient to
sustain the felony conviction. Before we can assess whether the
evidence is sufficient to support a felony theft conviction, we
must first determine whether the evidence that the ring was worth
$200 was properly admitted, as that evidence is necessary for a
felony conviction.
In reviewing a trial court's decision to admit evidence, we
will not reverse that ruling unless a substantial right of the
party has been affected. State v. Morgan, 162 Utah Adv. Rep. 61,
61 (Utah App. 1991) (citing Salt Lake Citv, v. Holtman, 806 P.2d
235, 237 (Utah App. 1991)); Utah R. Evid. 103(a).
Under Utah Rule of Evidence 602, a witness may only testify
about matters of which the witness has personal knowledge. A
witness may use a writing to refresh his or her memory for the
purpose of testifying. Utah R. Evid. 612(1).

2.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(1)(c) (1989) provides:
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this d-qpba:
shall be punishable:
•

• •

(c) as a class A misdemeanor if the value of the
property stolen was more than $100 but does not
exceed $250;
890625-CA
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It is evident from the trial transcript that Spielmans had no
independent knowledge or memory of the value of the ring, nor was
his memory refreshed after looking at the police report. He had
no present personal knowledge of the ring's value and, therefore,
his testimony concerning the value is inadmissible. We find that
admissible evidence supports only a class A misdemeanor theft
conviction. Therefore, we reverse and remand on the felony theft
conviction issue.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the trial court's
denial of the motion for a continuance, and reverse and remand on
the felony theft conviction for proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
WE CONCUR:

Norman H. Jackso

890625-CA
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

GREG N. OLIVER,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No, 890625-CA

Category No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from convictions for burglary, a
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202
(1990) and theft, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990).

This Court has jurisdiction to hear

the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (f) (Supp.
1990).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Was the trial court's denial of defendant's

requested one day continuance proper?

The granting of a

continuance is at the discretion of the trial court, whose
decision a reviewing court will not reverse unless it is
demonstrated that the decision constituted an abuse of
discretion.

State v. Humphervs, 707 P.2d 109 (Utah 1985); State

v. Linden, 761 P.2d 1386, 1387 (Utah 1988).
2.

Was defendant adequately represented at trial in

accord with his sixth amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel?

Review of this issue is based on a determination of

whether counsel's performance was deficient and, if so, whether

the deficient performance prejudiced defendant.

Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); State v. Frame, 723 P.2d
401, 405 (Utah 1986).
3.

Did the trial court correctly determine that

Spielmans's testimony concerning the value of the gold ring was
sufficient to establish the ring's value?

When a defendant

claims there was insufficient evidence to warrant sending the
case to the jury, a reviewing court will uphold the trial court's
decision if, upon reviewing the evidence and all inferences that
can be reasonably drawn from it, some evidence exists from which
a reasonable jury could find that the elements for .the crime had
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Dibello, 7 80

P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah 1989).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The language of the provisions upon which the State
relies is included in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Greg N. Oliver, was charged in an amended
information1 filed February 7, 1989, with one count of burglary,
a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202
(1990) and theft, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990) (Record [hereinafter R.] at 8).

1

Defendant was originally charged with the additional
offense of being a habitual criminal in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-8-1001 (1990); however, that charge was subsequently
dropped (R. at 6-8).
-2-

Defense counsel, Lynn R. Brown of Salt Lake Legal
Defender Association (SLLDA),2 filed a motion to suppress the
eyewitness identification of the victim witness, John Spielmans,
on the ground that the identification was made after Spielmans
was shown a single photograph of defendant (R. at 36). After a
hearing on the matter held April 28, 1989, the trial court denied
defendant's motion on the ground that the "totality of the
circumstances" surrounding Spielmans's identification of
defendant failed to demonstrate that any "misidentification" had
taken place (R. at 64; Transcript of suppression hearing, April
28, 1989 [hereinafter S.H.] at 289-91; a copy of the trial
court's oral findings is attached hereto as Addendum A ) .
Prior to trial on September 5, 1989, defense counsel,
Steven R. McCaughey, asked for a one day continuance on the
ground that he had not done "any formal trial preparation"
because he had anticipated defendant would enter a guilty plea to
a reduced charge (T. at 3).

The trial court denied the motion on

the ground that McCaughey had previously informed the court that
he would be ready to proceed with trial as scheduled at the
pretrial conference held August 28, 1989.

In denying defendant's

motion, the trial court expressly noted the problem had been

2

Although defendant was originally represented by SLLDA (R.
at 19-20), he also retained private counsel, Steven R. McCaughey,
who first appeared on defendant's behalf at an August 7, 1989,
hearing on a bench warrant which had been issued for defendant's
arrest (R. at 92). On August 25, 1989, SLLDA filed a motion to
withdraw as defense counsel on the ground that defendant had
hired McCaughey to represent him in future proceedings (R. at
93).
-3-

"created" by defendant who was unable to "make up his mind"
concerning the proffered plea bargain (R. at 8).

Thus, the court

further noted, "everyone needed to proceed, [as] if we were going
to trial . . . ." (R. at 8-9).
Following the two day jury trial conducted September 56, 1989, defendant was convicted as charged (R. at 162-63).
Defendant was sentenced on October 16, 1989, to an indeterminate
term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years and
ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $1,340.06 for the
burglary count.

He received an indeterminate sentence not to

exceed five years for the theft count, all terms to run
concurrently (R. at 166-67).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
At approximately 2:30 p.m., on the afternoon of January
7, 1989, the victim, John Spielmans, returned home from a
basketball game with his son (T. at 22). After parking his car
in the driveway, Spielmans proceeded to walk toward the front
door of his home when he noticed that a side door to his garage
was open (T. at 22-23).

Spielmans usually kept the door locked

and he remembered that the door had been closed when he left
earlier that afternoon (T. at 23). Upon entering the garage and
looking around, Spielmans noticed a bike seat missing from one of
the bikes stored in the garage (R. at 23-24).

As Spielmans

walked toward the bike, located beneath the garage window, he
observed an individual vaulting the gate of a chain link fence
approximately 10-12 feet away (T. at 23-23-24).
-4-

Spielmans

watched the individual head north and then exited the garage and
began following him (T. at 24). After losing sight of the
person, Spielmans returned to his front door and noticed that it
was "somewhat mangled" in the vicinity of the lock (T. at 25).
Spielmans's son indicated that he believed someone had been
inside the home (T. at 25). Standing in his front yard,
Spielmans telephoned 911 on his cordless phone (T. at 26). After
completing the call, Spielmans remained standing outside his home
(T. at 26). At that time, a neighbor drew his attention to a
person pressed up against a wooden fence across the street (T. at
26, 76). Based on the similarity of that person's clothing to
the individual he had earlier observed, Spielmans concluded it
was the same person he had seen vaulting the fence (T. at 26-27,
63). 3
Spielmans proceeded toward the person, who began
running in a southerly direction along the fence towards a
vehicle parked nearby (T. at 28, 34-35).

Although Spielmans

attempted to intercept the individual, he was not successful and
the individual entered the driver's side of the vehicle, just as
Spielmans approached the rear of the driver's side of the vehicle
(T. at 35-36).

As he climbed in the car, the individual looked

3

It is not clear from the record whether Spielmans
described the suspect in his call to 911; however, it is clear
that Spielmans described the individual he had observed to the
investigating officer, Deputy Kevin Matthews of the Salt Lake
County Sheriff's Department, the day of the incident (T. at 27,
104). Spielmans described the individual as wearing a levi
jacket, gold colored wire-rim glasses with clear lenses, and
having long blonde hair which extended below a navy blue or black
watchman type cap (T. at 27, 61-64).
-5-

over his left shoulder toward Spielmans and stated, "It wasn't
me, man" before driving off (T. at 35-36).

Spielmans then

returned to his own yard where he again called 911 from his
cordless telephone and described the vehicle including the
license plate number and its direction of travel (T. at 42).
Shortly thereafter, Deputy Matthews arrived to investigate the
crime (T. at 42).

Spielmans described the individual he had

observed to Deputy Matthews (see n.3, supra; T. at 104 ) A as well
as the vehicle5 he had driven away in, including the license
plate number (T. at 105). He also identified some missing items
including a watch, gold ring, four $1 dollar bills and four or
five gold Canadian coins (T. at '42, 71). 6
As part of his investigation that day, Deputy Matthews
also talked with Spielmans's neighbor, Robert R. Rufener, who
lived two houses east of Spielmans (T. at 84, 102-103).

Rufener

observed an individual he described as having long blond hair, a

A

Deputy Matthews testified that Spielmans described a
white male between the ages of 25-30 years old, approximately
five feet, ten inches tall, weighing approximately 180 pounds,
with blond curly hair and wearing wire rim glasses, black gloves
and a blue watchman-type hat (T. at 104-05). On crossexamination, Spielmans did not recall describing the individual's
height or weight to Deputy Matthews (T. at 61-62).
5

Spielmans described the vehicle as a white over red,
older model Monte Carlo (T. at 105).
6

Spielmans testified that at the time of the burglary he
believed the watch to be worth approximately $125, the gold ring
to be worth approximately $200 and the Canadian gold coins to be
worth approximately $.75 each (T. at 48-50).
-6-

mustache and wearing dark levi type clothing,7 cut west across
his front yard and then north across the street and west through
another yard before the individual hopped in a nearby car and
"sped away" (T. at 85-93; 105). Rufener described the same
vehicle as Spielmans (T. at 105).
Based on the foregoing information, Deputy Matthews
ran a computer check on the license plate of the vehicle and came
up with an address and the vehicle owner's name8 (T. at 108).
Deputy Matthews then proceeded to the vicinity of that address
for further investigation (T. at 108). When he did not observe
the suspect vehicle parked at the address he was investigating,
Deputy Matthews parked his police vehicle and walked to a
neighboring address (T. at 108). While he was speaking with
residents of the neighboring house, Deputy Matthews observed an
individual fitting the suspect's description leave the "residence
the suspect vehicle was registered to" (T. at 109). According to
Deputy Matthews, the suspect and a companion first became aware
of his presence when the companion commented, "That looks like a
cop car down the street" (T. at 113, 119). The suspect then

7

Rufener testified that the person he observed was not
wearing glasses (T. at 93).
8

State's witness, Karen C. Weed, the registered owner of a
1976 Monte Carlo, which she described as being brown with gray
primer spots and rust, testified that defendant frequently drove
the Monte Carlo and that he had driven it the day of the
incident, January 7, 1989 (T. at 177). She further testified
that she had known defendant five years during which time he wore
corrective glasses and that she believed defendant owned a pair
of gold wire rimmed glasses on the day of the incident (T. at
181).
-7-

began to hurry towards a green Oldsmobile Cutlass parked in the
street facing north (T. at 113-115)•

As he entered the green

Oldsmobile, the suspect looked at Deputy Matthews (who had exited
the neighboring house) with a look of shock on his face and drove
away (T. at 112-113).

Deputy Matthews, similarly hurried toward

his vehicle and attempted to give chase (T. at 115). He was able
to follow the green Oldsmobile for approximately a quarter of a
mile as it accelerated on the slick roads, exceeding the speed
limit by approximately 10-15 m.p.h., and occasionally swerved out
of control (T. at 115-16).
Based on his own observations, the license plate
number of the green Oldsmobile, and the descriptions of both
Spielmans and Rufener, Deputy Matthews subsequently obtained a
picture of defendant from the records division (T. at 116; S.H.
at 264). The next day, January 8, 1989, Deputy Matthews returned
to the Spielmans's home with the photo of defendant and showed it
to Spielmans, advising him that he (Matthews) had reason to
believe that the person in the photo was the same person
Spielmans had previously described (T. at 116-17).

According to

Deputy Matthews, Spielmans then looked at the photo and "took his
finger against the picture and said, 'That's the guy'" (T. at

-8-

117 ). 9

No other witnesses were shown the single photograph of

defendant (T. at 117, 122-23).10
Approximately three days after the incident, Deputy
Matthews put together a photo spread, including a picture of
defendant and five other individuals (T. at 118). That photo
spread was subsequently shown to Speilmans who again identified
defendant as the suspect (T. at 54-61, 127). u

No other photos

9

Spielmans testified that he merely indicated that the
individual in the picture "appeared to be" the same person he had
observed running from his yard (T. at 52, 66). Spielmans further
testified that Deputy Matthews refused to tell him the name of
the suspect in the photo and that he only became aware of
defendant's identity after looking at a photo spread shown to him
two or three days later (T. at 69).
Matthews testified that he only showed Spielmans the
single photograph of defendant because he knew Spielmans worked
at Adult Parole and Probation and because Spielmans had
previously informed Matthews that he probably knew the suspect
that fled from his home (T. at 124-25).
10

Defenc i asserts that Deputy Matthews's written report
of his investigation suggests that the single photograph was
shown to all the witnesses; however, a copy of the police report
has not been included in the record on appeal. Moreover, Deputy
Matthews testified that notwithstanding the language of the
police report, he only showed the single photo of defendant to
Spielmans and possibly Spielmans's son (T. at 122-23).
11

Specifically, Spielmans identified the center picture of
the top row of the photo spread which was received into evidence
as State's exhibit #15 (T. at 60-61). Because the prosecutor did
not elicit a repponse from Spielmans at trial that the center
picture of the op row was in fact a photo of defendant, and
because State'£ exhibit #15 has not been included in the record
on appeal, the State assumes that the center picture in the top
row was in fact a photo of defendant, based on the lack of
objection and/or cross-examination of Spielmans from defense
counsel concerning Spielmans's identification of that particular
photo as the perpetrator (T. at 61-70). Significantly, the
prosecutor did elicit a response from Spielmans at the
suppression hearing that the center picture of the top row of the
photo spread was a picture of defendant (S.H. at 232).
-9-

were shown to Spielmans in between the time Deputy Matthews
showed him the single photo of defendant and the time he picked
defendant's picture out of the photo spread (T. at 69). 12
Spielmans identified defendant again at a subsequent lineup, as
well as in court (T. at 55-58)•
In addition to Spielmans, the photo spread was shown to
several of Spielmans's neighbors, including Rufener, who
similarly identified defendant as the person he had observed the
day of the incident (T. at 90).13

At a subsequent lineup,

Rufener again identified defendant (T. at 91-92, see State's
exhibit #16).1A

He was also able to positively identify

defendant in court during trial (T. at 92).
12

At trial, Spielmans did not recall whether the single
photo of defendant he was shown by Matthews was the same photo
used in the photo spread (T. at 67). However, at the suppression
hearing Spielmans appeared to testify that the photo used in the
subsequent photo spread was the same photo Deputy had shown to
him on January 8, 1989 (S.H. at 229-30).
13

Rufener, like Spielmans, identified the center picture of
the top row (T. at 90). As before, the State assumes that the
center picture in the top row was in fact a photo of defendant
based on the lack of objection and/or cross-examination of
Rufener from defense counsel concerning Rufener's identification
of that particular photo as the perpetrator (T. at 93). See
n.11, supra.
14

Although a photo of a lineup is included among the
exhibits in the record on appeal, that photo (State's exhibit
#13) was not received into evidence (T. at 55-57). It is not
entirely clear from the record whether Rufener's lineup
identification card, received into evidence as State's exhibit
#16, relates to State's exhibit #13, or another photo of another
lineup, or both. In any event, no photo of a lineup was received
into evidence (T. at 2a, 55-57). Therefore, the State assumes,
based on the lack of objection or cross-examination from defense
counsel concerning Rufener's testimony regarding his lineup
identification, that Rufener identified defendant at that time
(T. at 93-95, defense counsel's cross examination of Rufener).
-10-

Lou Carol Roberts, another neighbor, was also shown the
photo spread a few days after the incident (T. at 77-78).
Roberts, whose house was apparently "two doors" down from
Spielmans,13 was in her backyard cutting wood the day of the
incident, when she observed an individual she described as having
long blond hair, short over the ears and longer in back running
through her yard (T. at 74-75).

Roberts asked, "Who are you?",

to which the individual responded, "My car broke down."
replied, "Well, who are you?"

Roberts

At that point the individual ran

and jumped over the fence and into another neighbor's yard (T. at
74).

Roberts saw the same individual again a short time later

while she was standing in her front yard talking with a neighbor
about the incident, at which time she alerted Spielmans, who was
standing in his yard, to the suspect across the street (T. at
76).

Like Spielmans and Rufener, Roberts identified the middle

picture in the top row as the person she had observed the day of
the incident (T. at 77-80).16

At a subsequent lineup, Roberts

Although it is not entirely clear from the record, it is
a reasonable inference from the testimony of Deputy Matthews and
the victim, John Spielmans, that Roberts's house was located
north of the Spielmans home on Birch Drive, which street runs in
a north and south direction (T. at 24 (Spielmans watched the
suspect head north); 107 (Matthews observed footprints leading
away from Spielmans's backyard in a northerly direction toward
the Roberts home)).
16

Based on the reasons previously stated in n.ll and n.13
supra, as well as on the lack cf objection and/or cross
examination from defense counsel concerning Roberts's testimony
on this point, the State assumes that the picture Roberts
identified in the photo spread was in fact a picture of defendant
(T. at 79-81, defense counsel's cross examination of Roberts).
Significantly, Roberts testified that she was never shown the
single photo of defendant and that she was not told whether in
-11-

was unable to pick out the person she had seen the day of the
incident because it had simply been too long ago17 (T. at 79).
John R. Call, a neighbor who happened to be driving
past the Rufener house the day of the incident, was also shown
the photo spread a few days later (T. at 99). Although he was
able to pick out two possible suspects, he was unable to exactly
identify the individual he had observed the day of the incident
(T. at 99). 18

He was similarly unable to identify the

individual with certainty at a subsequent lineup (T. at 100).
See n.17 supra.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant has not demonstrated that he was denied due
process by the trial court's denial of his request for a one day
continuance; nor has he demonstrated that he was denied the
effective assistance of trial counsel.

First, defendant made no

argument to the trial court that he needed more time to obtain
material and admissible evidence, that such evidence could
fact the suspect's picture was included in the photo spread (T.
at 79-80) .
17

It appears from the record that there was a 12 week
interval between the time the witnesses were shown the photo
spread and the time of the lineup (P.H. at 285).
18

Call had been driving down Ash Circle past the Rufener
residence when a man dashed out from behind a fence and ran in
front of his car (T. at 96). Call had to slam on his brakes to
keep from hitting the individual who ran across the street to a
car parked facing east, in between the Rufener residence and the
west line of the Roberts residence (T. at 97). Call described
the individual he had seen as being in his late 20's or early
30's with long blond hair and an athletic build (T. at 98). Call
described the car as a 2-door slanting hatch-back with gray spots
which appeared to have been primed for painting (T. at 98).
-12-

actually be produced within a reasonable time, or that he had
exercised due diligence before requesting the continuance.
Where, as here, the sole ground presented to the trial court in
support of defendant's requested one day continuance was the need
for more "formal" trial preparation, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in denying the motion.
Second, defendant has failed to provide record support
for his wholly speculative allegations of ineffective assistance
of trial counsel.

Not one of defendant's allegations

demonstrates either deficient performance or prejudice.
Moreover, the record before this Court is totally devoid of any
indication that trial counsel's performance was hindered in any
manner by the trial court's denial of his request for a one day
continuance.

Because defendant has failed to point to any

specific, identified acts or omissions that fall outside the wide
range of professionally competent assistance, his allegations of
ineffectiveness are without merit.
Finally, defendant appears to allege that the evidence
of value introduced at trial is insufficient to support his
conviction for third degree felony theft.

However, because

defendant has failed to provide this Court with any meaningful
legal analysis or authority concerning his claim, this Court may
properly decline to consider the merits of defendant's
allegation.
Even assuming this Court determines that defendant's
analysis of the issue merits review, the evidence of value
-13-

introduced at trial is sufficient to support defendant's
conviction for felony theft.

Contrary to defendant's apparent

assertion, it is not necessary that the victim independently
recall the value of the stolen property to properly establish its
value.

Where, as here, the victim had "forgotten" his previous

valuation of the property, his testimony concerning his prior
statement of value as recorded in a police report was clearly
admissible nonhearsay.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT WAS NOT DENIED DUE PROCESS BY THE
TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF HIS REQUEST FOR A ONE
DAY CONTINUANCE; NOR WAS HE DENIED THE
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
Defendant asserts that he was denied due process and
the effective assistance of counsel during his two day jury trial
because the trial court refused to grant defense counsel's
request for a one day continuance (Br. of App. at 14). In so
phrasing his argument, defendant mixes two distinct legal
questions.

Defendant's challenge to the trial court's denial of

the requested continuance requires this Court to consider whether
the denial was an abuse of the trial court's discretion.
v. Humphervs, 707 P.2d 109, 109-110 (Utah 1985).

State

Defendant's

challenge to the effectiveness of trial counsel, on the other
hand, requires this Court to determine whether trial counsel's
performance was deficient and, if so, whether that performance
prejudiced defendant at trial.
893 (Utah 1989).

State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886,

Therefore, for purposes of clarity the State
-14-

will present separate analysis, first addressing defendant's
claim that he was denied due process by the trial court's denial
of his request for a one day continuance.

Second, the State will

address defendant's apparent allegation that trial counsel's
pretrial preparation was deficient and prejudicial.
A. The trial court's denial of defendant's
request for a one day continuance was proper.
Prior to the first day of trial on September 5, 1989,
defense counsel, Steven R. McCaughey, asked for a one day
continuance on the ground that he had not done "any formal trial
preparation" because he had anticipated defendant would enter a
guilty plea to a reduced charge (T. at 3-4). The trial court
denied the motion, expressly noting that the trial date had
already been continued twice, once at the request of defendant's
previous defense counsel, Lynn R. Brown, and once due to the nonappearance of defendant (T. at 4-5). The court further noted
that McCaughey had previously informed the court that he would be
ready to proceed with trial as scheduled at the pretrial
conference held August 28, 1989 (T. at 5; Transcript of pretrial
conference, April 28, 1989 [hereinafter P.T.] at ll).19
Finally, the court noted that the problem had been "created" by
defendant who was unable to "make up his mind" concerning the
proffered plea bargain (T. at 8).
19

Thus, the court concluded,

Apparently, both the final pretrial conference, as well
as the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress were held on
August 28, 1989. The transcript of the pretrial conference is
contained in a separate "supplement index" which is a volume
different from the one containing the transcript of the
suppression hearing.
-15-

"everyone needed to proceed, [as] if we were going to trial" (T.
at 8-9 ). 2 0
"It is well established in Utah, as elsewhere, that the
granting of a continuance is at the discretion of the trial
judge," whose decision this Court will not reverse unless it is
demonstrated that the decision constituted an abuse of
discretion,

Humphervs, 707 P.2d at 109 (citations omitted);

State v. Linden, 761 P.2d 1386, 1387 (Utah 1988).

See also State

20

Moreover, at the conclusion of the State's case in chief,
the trial court made the following observations concerning his
previous denial of defendant's requested continuance:
Each of the witnesses who testified
yesterday, it seemed to me, that there was
full availability of cross-examination by Mr,
McCaughey and he took advantage of that. One
of the reasons why I wanted to make sure
whether or not Mr, McCaughey wanted the
witnesses back was in the event there was any
appeal on this question of a continuance, I
want to make sure the record is very clear
that full opportunity had been made available
to the defendant, to the witnesses, and all
of which indicates to me that where I think
I'm absolutely correct on denying the motion
to a continuance, even if for some reason,
I'm wrong, is it's very clear -chat any error
has been harmless in the sense that full
access has been had to witnesses, and in
fact, since the trial did not conclude in the
first day, that there has been extra time to
prepare, extra time to do whatever is
necessary, so that there's no conditions of
denial on the motion for continuance, except
for moving the case along, which is a
bearable factor.
Furthermore, it appears to me that there may
have been some benefit in the sense that this
witness you mentioned, Mrs. Lehman, is not
available,
(T. at 146) .
-16-

v. Barker, 35 Wash. App. 388, 667 P.2d 108, 114 (Wash. App. 1983)
(noting that the test is the same "even though the constitutional
issue of effective assistance of counsel is involved") (citation
omitted)).

Although "[a]buse may be found where a party has made

timely objections, given necessary notice and made a reasonable
effort to have the trial date reset for good cause," defendant
has not demonstrated that the above criteria were met in this
case.

State v. Creviston, 646 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1982)

(citation omitted).

Defendant made no argument to the trial

court that he needed more time to obtain material and admissible
evidence, that such evidence could actually be produced within a
reasonable time, or that he had exercised due diligence before
requesting the continuance. .Id.* Where, as here, the sole ground
presented to the trial court in support of defendant's requested
one day continuance was the need for more "formal preparation,"
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
motion.

IcL at 753 (noting that review of the propriety of the

trial ccart's action was necessarily confined to those issues and
documents before the trial court at the time of the denial of the
motion).

See also State v. Jackson, 637 P.2d 887, 888 (Okla. Cr.

App. 1981) (noting that record failed to demonstrate that the
trial court abused its discretion in denying a continuance on the
ground that defendant needed more time to prepare).
B.

Defendant was effectively represented at trial.

As a result of the trial court's denial of his
requested one day continuance, defendant asserts that his trial
-17-

counsel failed to (1) present additional evidence regarding a
previous case in which defendant had been misidentified; (2) more
fully explore alleged weaknesses in the eyewitness
identifications in the present case; (3) present additional
evidence to contradict Officer Matthews's testimony that he
observed defendant the day of the incident and (4) present
evidence in support of defendant's testimony (Br. of App. 21-26).
Defendant levels these allegations with no record support
demonstrating that trial counsel's pretrial preparation was
either deficient or prejudicial.
A defendant who raises a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel must show both that counsel rendered a
deficient performance in some demonstrable manner and that a
reasonable probability exists that but for counsel's deficient
performance, the result of the trial would have been different.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Carter, 776 P.2d
at 893; State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986).

A

"[d]efendant must prove that specific, identified acts or
omissions fall outside the wide range of professionally competent
assistance.

The claim may not be speculative, but must be a

demonstrative reality[.]"

Frame, 723 P.2d at 405. And, the

deficient performance must be so prejudicial as "to undermine
confidence in the reliability of the verdict."

Id.

Here, not one of defendant's allegations meets either
the deficient performance prong or the prejudice prong of the
Strickland test.

Rather, the record before this Court is totally
-18-

devoid of any indication that trial counsel's performance was
hindered in any manner by the trial court's denial of his request
for a one day continuance.21

Defendant's wholly speculative

assertions concerning what trial counsel "could have addressed,"
together with his lack of record support, fail to demonstrate
either deficient performance or prejudice to his defense.
Because defendant has failed to point to any specific, identified
acts or omissions that fall outside the wide range of
professionally competent assistance, his allegations of
ineffectiveness are without merit.
POINT II
DEFENDANT'S ALLEGATION IN POINT II OF HIS
BRIEF HAS NOT BEEN PROPERLY PRESENTED TO THIS
COURT; ALTERNATIVELY, THE EVIDENCE OF VALUE
INTRODUCED AT TRIAL IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
DEFENDANT'S FELONY THEFT CONVICTION.
Defendant appears to assert that evidence of the value
of the stolen property is insufficient to support his third
degree felony conviction; therefore, the trial court should have
granted trial counsel's motion to reduce the felony theft charge
tc a misdemeanor.

In support of his claim defendant merely notes

that Spielmans "never indicated personal knowledge" concerning
the value of the ring, and that the police report was not
admitted into evidence (Br. of App. at 27). 22
21

"Thus," defendant

See n.20 supra.

22

Although defendant cites State v. Morrell, 803 P.2d 292,
298 (Utah 1990), for the proposition that police reports are not
generally admissible under the business and public records
exceptions to the hearsay rule, that exception to the hearsay
rule is not at issue in this case (Br. of App. at 27).
-19-

concludes, "it appears that the approximate value of the property
properly established by the State" was insufficient to support a
charge of felony theft (Br. of App. at 27). As for his analysis
of the trial court's denial of his motion to reduce the felony
theft charge, defendant vaguely asserts that "[t]his Court's
review of Mr. Spielmans' testimony will reveal that the trial
court's finding was clearly erroneous" (Br. of App. at 28).
Because defendant has failed to provide this Court with any
meaningful legal analysis or authority concerning his claim, this
Court may properly decline to consider the merits of defendant's
allegations.

State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984).

Even assuming this Court determines that defendant's
analysis of the issue merits review, the evidence of value
introduced at trial is sufficient to support defendant's
conviction for felony theft pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412
(1990).23

The trial court found that the total value of the

stolen property was $335 (T. at 143), which value clearly meets
the value element of third degree felony theft.

See n.23 supra.

On appeal to this Court, defendant appears to attack the trial
court's finding only insofar as it is supported by Spielmans's
23

Section 76-6-412 provides in pertinent part:
(1) Theft of property and services as
provided in this chapter shall be punishable:
.

• . .

(b) as a felony of the third degree if the:
(i) value of the property or services is more
than $250 but not more than $1,000. . . .
(c) as a class A misdemeanor if the value of
the property stolen was more than $100 but
does not exceed $250. . . .
-20-

testimony concerning a gold ring which Spielmans valued at $200
(T. at 50).

Because Spielmans was unable to independently recall

the value of the gold ring, defendant appears to assert that the
total value of the stolen items amounts to only approximately
$140 (Br. of App. at 27).
However, contrary to defendant's assertion, it was not
necessary for Spielmans to independently recall at trial the
value of the gold ring to properly establish its value.
Spielmans testimony concerning his previous valuation of the ring
was clearly admissible nonhearsay under Rule 801(d)(1)(A) of the
Utah Rules of Evidence which provides:
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A
statement is not hearsay if:
(1) The declarant testifies at the trial or
hearing and is subject to cross-examination
concerning the statement and the statement is
(A) inconsistent with his testimony or the
witness denies having made the statement or
has forgotten. . . .
Although he was unable to independently recall the exact value of
the ring at trial, Spielmans testified that he had previously
given a value for the ring which was recorded in Officer
Matthews's report (T. at 49-50).

After reading over the report,

Spielmans testified without objection that, "I really can't
recall.

It states $200 on there.

That's what I said.

If it

says $200 on there, that's what I said" (T. at 50).
Significantly, defendant does not appear to dispute the value of
the ring as reflected in the police report; rather, defendant
merely objects to the fact that Spielmans was unable to
independently recall the value he had previously given for the
-21-

ring (Br, of App. at 27). Because Spielmans had forgotten the
value he had previously given for the gold ring, it was
permissible for him to testify concerning his prior statement of
value as contained in the police report.

In light of Spielmans's

testimony based on the police report, it was not necessary that
the actual report be introduced into evidence.

Assuming the

police report had been offered, the trial court could have
properly received it into evidence pursuant to the nonhearsay
rule.

State v. Calamity, 735 P.2d 39, 42 (Utah 1987) (where

prosecution witness could not remember some of the events
recounted in a prior written statement, the trial court properly
received prior statement into evidence under rule 801(d)(1)(A)).
Thus, defendant's allegations concerning the propriety of
Spielmans's testimony are without merit.
Admittedly the trial court denied defendant's motion to
reduce the felony theft on grounds other than those stated
above.24
24

Although Spielmans's testimony concerning the value of
Specifically, the trial court stated:
Well, let me just indicate this, that I agree
that at best, from your client's perspective,
his testimony was a bit garbled. However, I
believe that his testimony on refreshing his
recollection, although he did not use the
magic words that refresh your recollection,
that he did confirm that that refreshed his
view of the value at the time, the $200. And
I was listening to that testimony closely as
it came in, and it was right at the end of
that submatter that he finally kind of
stumbled into it. And therefore, the motion
will be denied.

(T. at 143-44).
-22-

the gold ring would be admissible on either ground, it is not
entirely clear from the record that Spielmans's memory was
refreshed by the police report (T. at 50)• However, this Court
may sustain a trial court's evidentiary ruling on any available
ground, even though the trial court assigned another reason for
its ruling.

State v. Galleqos, 712 P.2d 207, 209 (Utah 1985)

(citing State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257, 260 (Utah 1985)).

Because

Spielmans's prior statement as recorded in the police report is
clearly admissible nonhearsay pursuant to rule 801(d)(1)(A), this
Court may properly affirm the trial court's ruling on that
ground.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests
this Court to affirm defendant's convictions.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this c 3 # day of April, 1991.
PAUL VAN DAM
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ADDENDUM A

1

like I say, I haven't had the benefit of her cases yet.

2

But under the totality of the circumstances, there is no

3

demonstrated need to do what he did here, and as a result,

4

it should be suppressed.

5
6
7

THE COURT:

All right.

I am prepared to rule in

this case.
I have looked at the Biggers case and I will give

8

you an opportunity on down the pike, when it's convenient,

9

Mr. Brown, to indicate to me that Biggers is not the

10
11

applicable law in this case.
But it does appear to me to be applicable and

12

controlling in this particular circumstances.

13

if that is the right term, was not the best practice, and

14

is something that should not occur.

15

unlike the Utah Supreme Court, is not one that has

15

supervisory power over other courts.

17

has supervisory power of misconduct.

18

What I do is not precedent.

The showup,

However, this court,

Nor is it one that

What I do is rule in

19

a particular case.

Those other things are for our courts

20

at other times.

2i

part.^ular case is determine from the totality of the

22

circumstances whether or not these circumstances present a

23

situation where there is the likelihood of

24

misidentification.

25

there is a likelihood of misidentification.

And what I am supposed to do in this

Showups can present circumstances where
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1

In this case, however, that did not occur.

If

2 Officer Matthews had been arbitrary or capricious in
3

selecting the particular individual picture to be shown,

4 then there might be more difficulty, or there would
5

certainly be some difficulty here.

However, the way the

6 picture was selected at least gives the court some
7
8
9

assurance that there is not a misidentification here.
Furthermore, testimony of Mr. Spielmans indicated
that two to three months later, in March of this year,

10 there was an identification that was related back to his
11 original citing of the person he has identified as the
12 defendant, rather than tracing it back to the showing of
13 the picture to him by Mr. Matthews.
14

I don't think this is a circumstance where we

15 have a constitutional right involved.

It doesn't rise to

16 that level, and it is my feeling that in this particular
17 case, because there is no constitutional deprivation and
18 because there has been no violation of the statute or a
19 rule, that the proper way for this identification to be
20 challenged is by cross-examination of the witnesses in
21 front of a jury and to present to that jury the factors
22 under the standard set in State vs. Long for them to make a
23 determination as to identification.
24

And as you know, Mr. Brown, from a case you tried

25 in front of me, State vs. Root, I believe it was, is that
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1 that is a formidable weapon in the arsenal of defending
2

people from charges, because juries are concerned about

3

witness identification and they do take that into

4

consideration.

5
6

So for the reasons I have stated, the motion to
suppress is denied.

7

Do we have this case scheduled?

8 I

MR. BROWN:

9

Yes, Your Honor.

It is set for trial

on May 31, and for pretrial on March 22.

10

THE COURT:

All right.

Is there anything further

11 at this time?
12

MS. BYRNE:

Nothing further from the state, Your

MR. BROWN:

The court indicated that you would

13 Honor.
14 I

15 consider more argument on this after I have—
15

THE COURT:

Yes.

You indicated to me that you

17 hadn't had an opportunity to see those cases.
18

MR. BROWN:

I expect to do so at the pretrial.

19

THE COURT:

Thatfs fine.

21

MR. BROWN:

Thank you.

22

THE COURT:

Let me hand back to Ms. Byrne the

We will hear you out

20 then.

23 cases or the copies of the cases she gave me so that she
24 can give them back to me at the pretrial, because otherwise
25 they will get lost.
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